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Article 
What Makes Ensuring Access to 
Affordable Prescription Drugs the 
Hardest Problem in Health Policy? 
Michelle M. Mello† 
  INTRODUCTION   
I recently had a front-row seat at a performance of the ca-
cophonous choir that is our nation’s prescription drug delivery 
system. This anecdote of getting an unremarkable drug to a child 
captures many of the things that make our system the object of 
international befuddlement. 
My seven-year-old son is among the nearly four percent of 
Americans with a food allergy1 and needs to have epinephrine 
available wherever he goes.2 For years, we have relied on the 
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Yale Law School; M.Phil., University of Oxford; A.B., Stanford University. I 
have no financial relationships with pharmaceutical or biotechnology compa-
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cludes pharmacy benefit management, on a topic unrelated to prescription 
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icine’s Committee on Ensuring Patient Access to Affordable Drug Therapies 
(“the Committee”) to generating some of the findings and identifying much of 
the evidence discussed in this Article. For the Committee’s full report, see MAK-
ING MEDICINES AFFORDABLE: A NATIONAL IMPERATIVE (Norman R. Augustine, 
Guru Madhavan & Sharyl J. Nass eds., 2017), http://www.nationalacademies 
.org/hmd/Reports/2017/making-medicines-affordable-a-national-imperative 
.aspx. I am also grateful to Chuck Phelps for helpful comments on the draft 
manuscript and Quinn Walker for research assistance. Copyright © 2018 by 
Michelle M. Mello. 
 1. Warren W. Acker et al., Prevalence of Food Allergies and Intolerances 
Documented in Electronic Health Records, 140 J. ALLERGY & CLINICAL IMMU-
NOLOGY 1587, 1588 (2017) (finding 3.6% of Americans have a food allergy). 
 2. Epinephrine, another name for the hormone adrenaline, is a rescue 
medication for allergic anaphylaxis. See Lydia Ramsey, The Strange History of 
the EpiPen, the Device Developed by the Military That Turned into a Billion-
Dollar Business, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 27, 2016), http://www.businessinsider 
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EpiPen Jr., sold by Mylan Pharmaceuticals. It is an indisputably 
great product: the auto-injector is easy to use, small enough to 
fit in a purse, and able to deliver a dose in ten seconds. 
However, in 2016, public opinion turned against Mylan. The 
company had been raising the price of the EpiPen for years, and 
by 2016 the “massive” price increases caught the attention of the 
media and high-profile members of Congress.3 The price of a two-
pack of auto-injectors, containing about $2 worth of drug,4 rose 
from about $100 in 2007 to over $600 in 2016.5 The company 
offered no substantive justification for the price increases. Com-
mentators interpreted them as a last-ditch effort to extract value 
in the waning days of the EpiPen’s patent.6 The public responded 
with outrage.7 Patient advocates stressed that patients were ex-
posed to significant out-of-pocket costs, especially since families 
 
.com/the-history-of-the-epipen-and-epinephrine-2016-8/#when-mylan-acquired 
-the-epipen-the-drug-was-making-about-200-million-a-year-now-it-makes 
-more-than-11-billion-a-year-mylan-has-about-90-of-the-market-share-for 
-epinephrine-devices-9. Produced naturally by the body, epinephrine was iso-
lated as a chemical over a century ago and has been commercially available in 
the United States for decades. Id. The drug itself costs only a few dollars a vial, 
but most users need it in an easily injectable form, and the surrounding auto-
injector device has been where manufacturers have made their money. Id. The 
first auto-injector was developed in the 1970s and used in the military to protect 
soldiers against possible chemical attacks. Id. In 1987, Meridian Medical Tech-
nologies obtained FDA approval for the drug/device combination branded the 
EpiPen, an easy-to-administer, one-dose auto-injector. Id. Since 2007, the Ep-
iPen (and its pediatric version, the EpiPen Jr.) has been sold and marketed by 
Mylan Pharmaceuticals. Id. As of 2016, Mylan controlled about ninety percent 
of the market for epinephrine devices. Id.  
 3. Chris Woodyard & Mary Jo Layton, Massive Price Increases on EpiPens 
Raise Alarm, USA TODAY (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.usatoday.com/story/ 
money/business/2016/08/22/two-senators-urge-scrutiny-epipen-price-boost/ 
89129620. 
 4. Ben Popken, Industry Insiders Estimate EpiPen Costs No More Than 
$30, NBC NEWS (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/ 
industry-insiders-estimate-epipen-costs-no-more-30-n642091. 
 5. Sy Mukherjee, Mylan’s CEO Tells Congress the EpiPen’s Price Hike Was 
“Fair,” FORTUNE (Sept. 21, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/09/21/mylan 
-ceo-epipen-price-hike. 
 6. Andrew Pollack, Mylan Raised EpiPen’s Price Before the Expected Arri-
val of a Generic, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/ 
25/business/mylan-raised-epipens-price-before-the-expected-arrival-of-a 
-generic.html. 
 7. Tim Chester, How Social Media Amplified Anger over EpiPen’s Price 
Gouge, MASHABLE (Aug. 27, 2016), http://mashable.com/2016/08/27/epipen 
-price-hike-social-media. 
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with young children may require three or more packs for differ-
ent caregivers.8 Mylan’s chief executive, Heather Bresch, drew 
scorn for her performance defending the price increases in testi-
mony before the House Oversight Committee in October 2016, 
deflecting questions in a manner that “infuriated lawmakers.”9 
I shared in the outrage, so I was receptive when my son’s 
allergist told us that an alternative product was available. The 
Auvi-Q auto-injector, manufactured by Kaleo, administers the 
same drug as the EpiPen, is somewhat easier to use because it 
has audio instructions, is slightly smaller, and delivers its dose 
in five seconds. “A lot of my patients like it because it talks the 
babysitter through the injection,” our Harvard-educated physi-
cian said. “Of those who have tried it, I’d say about nine out of 
ten stick with it instead of going back to EpiPen. And the com-
pany is offering a zero-cost prescription for patients if you call 
this number.” I was sold. 
Weeks later, I would learn that Auvi-Q’s list price was a 
staggering $4500 per pack.10 The “no-cost” program, it turned 
out, was limited to three fills. After that I would have to rely on 
my insurance coverage and make a copayment with each refill. 
I called my insurance company to ask what I would pay for 
Auvi-Q when the program ran out, as well as what the insurer 
itself paid. As pharmaceutical companies often point out, the list 
price of a drug can be considerably higher than what health 
plans and other bulk purchasers actually pay after discounts and 
 
 8. Emily Willingham, Why Did Mylan Hike EpiPen Prices 400%? Because 
They Could, FORBES (Aug. 21, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
emilywillingham/2016/08/21/why-did-mylan-hike-epipen-prices-400-because 
-they-could. 
 9. Associated Press, Mylan CEO Minimized EpiPen Profits in Testimony, 
House Panel Says, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/business/ 
la-fi-mylan-epipen-20161003-snap-story.html. 
 10. Meg Tirrell, EpiPen Competitor Auvi-Q Comes Back Feb. 14 with a Pric-
ing Scheme That Will Blow Your Mind, CNBC (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www 
.cnbc.com/2017/01/19/epipen-competitor-auvi-q-comes-back-feb-14.html. The 
list price of a drug is what the manufacturer states as the retail or sticker  price, 
before any discounts and rebates are granted to purchasers. KAISER FAMILY 
FOUND., FOLLOW THE PILL: UNDERSTANDING THE U.S. COMMERCIAL PHARMA-
CEUTICAL SUPPLY CHAIN 28 (2005), http://avalere.com/research/docs/Follow_ 
the_Pill.pdf. 
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rebates.11 Indeed, when Mylan came under congressional scru-
tiny, its CEO emphasized that Mylan gave generous rebates on 
the drug and very few buyers actually paid list price.12 
My health insurer, the largest in the United States, was un-
able to tell me what it paid for the EpiPen. It referred me to its 
pharmacy benefit manager (PBM), an intermediary organization 
that procures medicines for the health plan and manages its pre-
scription drug formulary. My third phone call turned up the an-
swer: the discount the PBM had gotten my health plan was a 
whopping 2.35%. The insurer paid $4394.10 per pack for Auvi-
Q, versus $554.95 for the EpiPen. And there was more: my in-
surer didn’t cover Auvi-Q at all unless a physician attested that 
cheaper versions of epinephrine were medically contraindicated. 
That being unlikely, my projected out-of-pocket cost to refill the 
Auvi-Q would exceed $13,000 for the three packs my son needed, 
compared to $150 for the EpiPen.  
The tale of Auvi-Q and the EpiPen illustrates many of the 
market failures and perversities of our biopharmaceutical sec-
tor.13 A company with market dominance seeks to squeeze every 
last cent out of its government-granted monopoly period. It hikes 
the product’s price although the drug is globally recognized as 
an essential medication14 and although the company itself shoul-
dered none of the risk of developing the product. The company is 
 
 11. Rebates for drugs sold to Medicare Part D plans have been estimated 
to average about twenty percent in 2016. THE BDS. OF TRS., FED. HOSP. INS. & 
FED. SUPPLEMENTARY MED. INS. TR. FUNDS, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
BOARDS OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE AND FEDERAL 
SUPPLEMENTARY MEDICAL INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS 147 tbl.IV.B8 (51st ed. 
2016), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics 
-Trends-and-Reports/ReportsTrustFunds/downloads/tr2016.pdf. 
 12. Stacie B. Dusetzina et al., Association of Prescription Drug Price Re-
bates in Medicare Part D with Patient Out-of-Pocket and Federal Spending, 
177 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1185, 1185 (2017). 
 13. By biopharmaceutical sector, I mean the entire ecosystem that produces 
and delivers prescription drugs and biologics, including manufacturers and 
sellers, payers, prescribers, regulators, and patients. See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., 
ENG’G & MED., MAKING MEDICINES AFFORDABLE: A NATIONAL IMPERATIVE 15 
(Norman R. Augustine et al. eds., 2017), http://www.nationalacademies.org/ 
hmd/Reports/2017/making-medicines-affordable-a-national-imperative.aspx 
[hereinafter NASEM REPORT]. 
 14. WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO MODEL LIST OF ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 17 
(19th ed. 2015), http://www.who.int/medicines/publications/essentialmedicines/ 
EML_2015_FINAL_amended_NOV2015.pdf (listing pyrimethamine, which is 
sold under the brand name Daraprim, as an essential drug). 
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undeterred by the demonstrable “financial toxicity” that its es-
calating prices cause.15 When a public backlash ensues, a market 
opportunity is created, and a competitor seizes the chance to pro-
mote its marginally more attractive product. But rather than 
waging war on the basis of price, as economic theory would pre-
dict, the underdog prices its product more than seven times 
higher than the market leader. 
Yet, the challenger wins market share—not primarily be-
cause its product is superior, but because it exploits market fail-
ures. The company creates a patient coupon program that (at 
least temporarily) removes patients’ incentive to choose among 
comparable drugs based on cost.16 The program also drives a 
wedge between patients’ economic interests and those of their 
insurer. 
At the point of prescribing, the patient and physician are 
both ignorant about the comparative costs of the candidate med-
ications. The physician, who has been the target of marketing 
messages about the patient coupon program, thinks he is being 
helpful by recommending a more convenient medication that will 
cost patients less. He is mistaken. Further, the physician likely 
has no awareness of the cost of the candidate medications for 
even the most widely subscribed health plans. If he does, his be-
havior suggests he does not care. Rather, he is focused on drugs’ 
immediate costs to patients, not their long-term costs, including 
the fact that patients’ insurance premiums and cost sharing in-
crease when health plans’ costs rise. On the patient’s part, con-
siderable proactivity and persistence is required to discover 
what lies ahead in terms of out-of-pocket costs and which choice 
is more cost-effective for her insurance risk pool. 
It is not difficult to understand why such circumstances 
have permitted prescription drug costs to rise to unsustainable 
levels in the United States. After all, as the old engineering ad-
age goes, “every system is perfectly designed to get the result it 
gets.”17 Medicines now account for nearly seventeen percent of 
our total national healthcare expenditures.18 Except for 2016, 
 
 15. Financial Toxicity and Cancer Treatment (PDQ®): Health Professional 
Version, NAT’L CANCER INST., https://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/managing 
-care/track-care-costs/financial-toxicity-hp-pdq (last visited June 17, 2018).  
 16. For further discussion on patient coupon programs, see infra Part II.B. 
 17. NASEM REPORT, supra note 13, at 23. 
 18. Id. at 24–25 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OBSERVA-
TIONS ON TRENDS IN PRESCRIPTION DRUG SPENDING 7–8 (2016), https://aspe 
.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/187586/Drugspending.pdf ) (discussing drug expendi-
tures in the United States). 
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they have been among the fastest-growing segments of 
healthcare costs.19 In a recent survey, nearly one in four Ameri-
cans reported that they or a family member had declined to fill 
a prescription, skipped doses, or reduced their dose in the past 
year because of concerns about cost.20 Though it is difficult to 
find any issue today on which there is bipartisan agreement in 
Washington, even persons who cannot agree on whether or not 
the planet is warming agree that the problem of prescription 
drug costs requires action.21 
The United States faces a lot of hard problems in health pol-
icy, but arguably, reducing prescription drug costs is the hard-
est. It is more difficult, for example, than figuring out how to get 
all Americans basic health-insurance coverage, how to improve 
the quality of care and reduce disparities, or how to focus more 
resources on preventing disease rather than treating it. As I will 
show in this Article, there are a number of things about the pre-
scription drug affordability problem that make it distinctively 
tricky. These problems can be grouped under three rubrics: (1) 
moral factors; (2) market factors; and (3) political factors. 
In Part I, I discuss how empirical and moral ambiguity 
about the fundamental tradeoff involved in regulating drug 
prices—affordability versus availability of drugs, or access ver-
sus innovation—has plagued policy conversations. I also discuss 
how our lack of a workable moral framework for assessing phar-
maceutical companies’ obligations to patients has contributed to 
 
 19. Id. at 5; US Drug 2016 Sales, at $450 Billion, Moderate to Single-Digit 
Growth, PHARMACEUTICAL COM. (May 4, 2017), http://pharmaceuticalcommerce 
.com/latest-news/us-drug-2016-sales-450-billion-moderate-single-digit-growth. 
 20. Most Say They Can Afford Their Prescription Drugs, But One in Four 
Say Paying Is Difficult, Including More Than Four in Ten People Who Are Sick, 
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Aug. 20, 2015), https://www.kff.org/health-costs/press 
-release/most-say-they-can-afford-their-prescription-drugs-but-one-in-four-say 
-paying-is-difficult-and-more-than-four-in-ten-for-people-who-are-sick. 
 21. See, e.g., Ylan Mui, Democrats Take Aim at Big Business and Drug 
Prices in New Economic Campaign, CNBC (July 24, 2017), https://www.cnbc 
.com/2017/07/23/democrats-take-aim-at-big-business-drug-prices-in-economic 
-campaign.html (noting that prescription drug costs feature prominently in a 
new economic platform rolled out by Democrats in 2017); Andrew Siddons, Don’t 
Force Us to Address High Prices, GOP Tells Drug Industry, CQ NEWS (Dec. 13, 
2017), bit.ly/2CdBDXN (quoting Republican Chairman of the House Energy and 
Commerce Subcommittee on Health, Representative Michael C. Burgess, as 
saying the issue had reached a “tipping point” and “there will likely be some 
type of action” if the pharmaceutical industry did not solve the problem itself ); 
see also Drew Altman, Prescription Drug Costs Break Through the Partisan Log-
jam, AXIOS (May 2, 2017), https://www.axios.com/one-health-care-issue-breaks 
-through-the-partisan-logjam-2387900255.html (citing survey data showing 
that the issue’s bipartisan appeal extends to members of the public). 
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the regulatory dilemma. In Part II, I survey an array of market-
related factors that make the pharmaceutical problem especially 
messy. These include lack of price transparency and many kinds 
of perverse incentives. In Part III, I discuss the current political 
environment, in which current policy choices are constrained by 
ill-advised past choices, and in which an atmosphere of scandal 
makes cool-headed deliberation difficult. 
Much of what I will describe derives from a November 2017 
consensus report that I coauthored with other members of a com-
mittee of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and 
Medicine (NASEM).22 NASEM is a trio of scientific associations 
that work together “to provide independent, objective analysis to 
the nation and conduct other activities to solve complex prob-
lems and inform public policy decisions.”23 Its consensus reports 
provide evidence-based findings, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions on topics of public importance based on information that 
an ad hoc committee gathers and analyzes.24 Committee mem-
bers are selected to achieve diverse representation of expertise, 
experiences, and viewpoints. Recognized professional achieve-
ment is a precondition for selection25 and conflicts of interest are 
closely scrutinized in the appointment process.26 
Our committee, which deliberated for more than a year, in-
cluded seventeen economists, epidemiologists, physicians, legal 
experts, health-policy experts, and leaders from the public 
health, healthcare, health insurance, aerospace, finance, and bi-
opharmaceutical sectors.27 Where I draw on our report, I so in-
dicate in the footnotes. On the other hand, statements not at-
tributed to the report represent my own views and not those of 
the committee or NASEM. 
I.  MORAL FACTORS   
Three moral factors—ambiguity about the tradeoff between 
drug affordability and availability; lack of consensus about 
 
 22. NASEM REPORT, supra note 13. 
 23. Id. at iii. 
 24. Id. at iv. 
 25. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., ENG’G & MED., POLICY ON COMMITTEE COMPOSI-
TION AND BALANCE AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST FOR COMMITTEES USED IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF REPORTS *1 (2003), http://www.nationalacademies.org/coi/bi 
-coi_form-0.pdf. 
 26. Id. at *3–7. 
 27. For a summary of Committee members’ backgrounds, see NASEM RE-
PORT, supra note 13, at 179–88. For a description of the study process, see id. at 
37–38.  
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moral principles for assessing drug companies’ pricing behavior; 
and potential effects of U.S. actions to reduce drug prices on pharmaceu-
tical costs for lower-income countries—make drug prices an espe-
cially difficult problem to solve, or even talk about coherently. 
A. UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE CORE TRADEOFF: AFFORDABILITY 
VS. AVAILABILITY 
As with other problems in health policy, sorting out how to 
ensure that prescription drugs are affordable to all who need 
them raises weighty moral questions. Is healthcare a human 
right?28 Regardless, does society have a moral obligation to pro-
vide it to everyone, at least at a decent basic minimum level?29 
How great a disparity in access to care among different groups 
in the population is ethically tolerable? What mechanism should 
determine who receives healthcare resources—the market, or 
some more explicit rationing scheme? How much is a human life 
worth? Barrels of ink have been spilled over these questions. 
However, it is worth a closer look at some aspects of the moral 
debate that have distinctive salience for prescription drugs. 
One fundamental problem is that no consensus has emerged 
in the United States about how to grapple with the core tradeoff 
involved in the prescription drug market: the tradeoff between 
affordability and availability of innovative therapies.30 There is 
a risk that taking steps to lower what we pay for pharmaceuti-
cals will diminish manufacturers’ incentives to invest in re-
search and development (R&D). In other words, it may reduce 
the amount of innovation—and thus the availability of innova-
tive, safe, effective drugs in the future.31 The value of health eq-
uity, therefore, sits in tension with other values. While few 
would disagree that some risk of reduced innovation exists if 
 
 28. See id. at 6; Julia Lynch & Sarah E. Gollust, Playing Fair: Fairness 
Beliefs and Health Policy Preferences in the United States, 35 J. HEALTH POL. 
POL’Y L. 849 (2010) (exploring public perceptions of health care policy and how 
different message framing can lead to different levels of public support). 
 29. See NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH: MEETING HEALTH NEEDS FAIRLY 
17–21 (2008). 
 30. This section draws on NASEM REPORT, supra note 13, at 8–9, 28, 33. 
 31. NASEM REPORT, supra note 13, at 28; Sidney Taurel, The Campaign 
Against Innovation, in ETHICS AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 326 (Mi-
chael A. Santoro & Thomas M. Gorrie eds., 2005) (arguing that market-based 
pricing is an important precondition to innovation); Rena M. Conti & Meredith 
B. Rosenthal, Pharmaceutical Policy Reform—Balancing Affordability with In-
centives for Innovation, 374 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 703, 704–05 (2016); Ian Mait-
land, Priceless Goods: How Should Life-Saving Drugs Be Priced?, 12 BUS. ETH-
ICS Q. 451, 457–58 (2002). 
 2018] HEALTH POLICY’S HARDEST PROBLEM 2281 
 
downward pressure on prices is exerted, quantifying it is very 
difficult. The information needed to understand how companies 
would respond to reduced drug prices simply is not available. 
Companies certainly assert that there is cause for alarm.32 
They point to the astronomical cost of new drug development—
an estimated $2.6 billion for each drug that reaches the market, 
when the costs associated with those that did not make it are 
rolled in.33 Only five to ten percent of new drugs entering clinical 
trials obtain FDA approval,34 so innovator companies and firms 
that furnish the capital to support their R&D must recoup their 
investment from the tip of the iceberg. Investors may wait a dec-
ade or more to see a return on their investment, given the time 
required for clinical trials and market approval.35 Companies ar-
gue that they must promise supernormal returns in order to at-
tract interest in such a high-risk investment—especially because 
a great deal of biopharmaceutical innovation today emerges from 
small companies that rely heavily on private venture capital.36 
 
 32. See, e.g., NASEM REPORT, supra note 13, at 169 (presenting a dissent-
ing view from the Committee’s consensus recommendations that is animated by 
concerns about discouraging innovation); Michael Rosenblatt & Henri Termeer, 
Reframing the Conversation on Drug Pricing, NEJM CATALYST (Nov. 20, 2017), 
https://catalyst.nejm.org/reframing-conversation-drug-pricing (“For companies 
to justify risking billions on finding a breakthrough drug, they need to be able 
to anticipate a corresponding return on their investment.”). 
 33. Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: 
New Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20, 27 (2016) (estimating the 
cost of developing a new drug to be in the $2.3 billion to $2.8 billion range). The 
$2.6 billion figure is controversial. See, e.g., Jay Hancock, Do Pharma’s Claims 
on Drug Prices Pass the Smell Test? We Found 5 Stinkers, KAISER HEALTH 
NEWS (Oct. 2, 2017), https://khn.org/news/do-pharmas-claims-on-drug-prices 
-pass-the-smell-test-we-found-5-stinkers (“Outside authorities criticize the re-
search, saying it comes from untestable data, ignores enormous tax subsidies 
that reduce costs and inflates results with imaginary expenses, such as profits 
that could have been earned if drug companies invested research dollars else-
where.”). Competing estimates are lower, ranging from $161 million to $1.95 
billion, but the DiMasi et al. study has been influential in policy debates. For a 
summary, see NASEM REPORT, supra note 13, at 87–88. 
 34. NASEM REPORT, supra note 13, at 42 (citing Gail A. Van Norman, 
Drugs, Devices, and the FDA: Part 1: An Overview of Approval Processes for 
Drugs, 1 JACC: BASIC TO TRANSLATIONAL SCI. 170 (2016)).  
 35. See DiMasi et al., supra note 33, at 24 (finding that the average time 
from the start of clinical testing of a new molecule to FDA approval is approxi-
mately eight years). 
 36. NASEM REPORT, supra note 13, at 40 (“[T]he returns on investment for 
successful drug products may appear to be abnormally high, since the average 
expected return, from the manufacturer ’s point of view, must also compensate 
for many failures. . . . More risk leads to a higher average reward for success, 
thereby encouraging investments that might not otherwise occur.”). 
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Decrease the rewards for a big hit, they warn, and R&D will suf-
fer. 
How credible is that threat? It is hard to say. Some argue 
that there is plenty of loose money in the pharmaceutical indus-
try to support R&D.37 The industry is among the most profitable 
in the nation.38 As a group, drug companies spend more money 
on marketing than they do on R&D, and more on stock repur-
chases and dividends than on R&D.39 Yet, showing that compa-
nies have money to spare does not prove that they would redirect 
it to R&D if their profit margin were squeezed. In summary, as-
sessing the credibility of claims on both sides of the debate with 
the information available is challenging. 
Even more fundamentally, Americans do not agree about 
how much innovation we would be willing to forgo, even if we 
could quantify what the tradeoff would be. In a 2016 poll, sev-
enty-seven percent of Americans said that cost of branded pre-
scription drugs was unreasonable.40 Yet Americans have stead-
fastly resisted attempts to ratchet down healthcare costs that 
could threaten their access to care.41 We want it all, at reasona-
ble cost. 
 
 37. Id. at 9. 
 38. A number of studies have characterized the drug industry as among the 
most profitable, though their conclusions as to the precise net profit margins 
that pharmaceutical companies have experienced have varied somewhat. Those 
estimates tend to fall in the twenty-five to thirty percent range for manufactur-
ers of branded drugs. For a review, see NASEM REPORT, supra note 13, at 9, 
65–68. The most recent estimate comes from a November 2017 GAO study, 
which concluded that the average profit margin in 2015 was 17.1% (20.1% for 
the largest twenty-five companies) and that 67% of pharmaceutical companies 
experienced rising profit margins over the 2006 to 2015 period. GAO, GAO-18-
40, DRUG INDUSTRY: PROFITS, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SPENDING, AND 
MERGER AND ACQUISITION DEALS 17–18 (Nov. 2017). These estimates are dis-
puted by the industry’s main trade association, which argues that returns on 
investment in R&D have been declining. Ed Silverman, Lawmakers Who Scold 
Pharma for Price Gouging Get Some New Ammunition, PHARMALOT (Dec. 19, 
2017), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2017/12/19/drug-prices-rd 
-pharma. 
 39. See NASEM REPORT, supra note 13, at 89; William Lazonick et al., US 
Pharma’s Financialized Business Model 20 (Inst. for New Econ. Thinking, 
Working Paper No. 60, 2017). 
 40. Ashley Kirzinger et al., Kaiser Health Tracking Poll: September 2016 
(Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.kff.org/health-costs/report/kaiser-health-tracking 
-poll-september-2016. 
 41. See HENRY AARON ET AL., CAN WE SAY NO? THE CHALLENGE OF RA-
TIONING HEALTH CARE 1–10 (2005) (outlining the history of medicine in the 
United States and concluding that there is a propensity for emphasizing access 
to care rather than cost); Michelle Mello, Book Review, 44 J. ECON. LIT. 1049, 
1053 (2006) (reviewing id. and noting that “Americans are steadfastly unwilling 
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That is probably not possible. Until we confront this problem 
and agree on the goal we wish to pursue, we will not reach it. In 
other areas of healthcare, such as physician services, we also 
hear distress calls from providers when there is talk of reducing 
reimbursement. However, it is hard to think of another area of 
health policy where we risk reducing innovation if we clamp 
down on reimbursement. Thus uncertainty about the core 
tradeoff involved in reducing costs is an especially important, 
unresolved problem for prescription drugs. 
B. FINDING A COHERENT ETHICAL FRAMEWORK 
There is no shortage of righteous indignation in discussions 
of drug prices, but what is lacking is any anchoring of arguments 
in a coherent ethical framework. Addressing what is wrong in 
the current system requires that we have some conception of 
what right and wrong means for a pharmaceutical company. 
However, it is surprisingly difficult to fix upon an appropriate 
ethical principle or set of principles for evaluating drug compa-
nies’ practices relating to pricing and access. Certainly, no con-
sensus has emerged on this issue. Consequently, it is unsurpris-
ing that many of these companies feel they have been judged 
unfairly when they are accused of wrongful behavior, when other 
industries are subject to no such expectations. 
Some instances of pharmaceutical company conduct are so 
egregious that it is easy to agree that they constitute a moral 
wrong. As with obscenity, we sometimes have a strong sense that 
we “know it when [we] see it.”42 The leading, recent example is 
Turing Pharmaceuticals’ astronomical, overnight hike of the 
price of the parasitic infection drug, pyrimethamine (sold under 
the trade name Daraprim).43 Turing did not develop Daraprim, 
it acquired it. Daraprim was not a new drug, nor had anything 
in the market changed so as to justify the price increase. Rather, 
the decision appeared to be “all profit-driven.”44 
 
to make sacrifices when it comes to the quality and availability of their health 
care, even when those sacrifices are based on reasoned deliberation about what 
makes sense for us as a population”). 
 42. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 43. The company that acquired the drug in August 2015, Turing Pharma-
ceuticals, immediately raised its price from $13.50 to $750 per tablet. A full 
course for some patients at the increased price could run in the hundreds of 
thousands of dollars. Andrew Pollack, Drug Goes from $13.50 a Tablet to $750, 
Overnight, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/ 
business/a-huge-overnight-increase-in-a-drugs-price-raises-protests.html. 
 44. Id. 
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It is tempting to focus on such scandals in lieu of answering 
hard moral questions that undergird our intuitions about them. 
What makes companies’ conduct wrongful? What is a fair price? 
Instances of egregious conduct do not constitute the modal case 
of high drug costs. More commonly, what we tend to feel in re-
sponse to high drug costs is not, “This is an outrage!” but some-
thing closer to, “I don’t like this; I wish it were cheaper.” We may 
find ourselves struggling to articulate exactly why drug compa-
nies must take steps to make their products more affordable. 
One line of argumentation proceeds from the fact that pa-
tients who depend on life-preserving drugs are highly vulnera-
ble.45 Because they have no meaningful choice but to buy the 
drug at whatever price the seller wishes to charge, the usual pre-
sumptions about market exchanges—such as voluntariness, 
choice, and bargaining power—are disrupted. This arguably cre-
ates an ethical obligation on the part of the seller not to extract 
excessive benefits from those who cannot refuse its offer.46 A re-
ply to this argument is that this morally distressing situation 
may generate an obligation on the part of society to ensure that 
the patient receives the drug, but not on the part of the drug’s 
producer.47 
Because of pharmaceutical companies’ special status as both 
a for-profit manufacturer of goods and a provider of medical care, 
it is not clear where to reach for ethical standards to govern their 
conduct. As for-profit corporations, drug companies compete for 
capital in the open marketplace and must deliver returns to in-
vestors. Yet unlike providers of most products and services, they 
are delivering lifesaving products to highly vulnerable consum-
ers. Pharmaceutical companies’ own statements often 
acknowledge their special commitment to bringing effective 
therapies to patients around the world.48 Innovator pharmaceu-
 
 45. The remainder of this Section and the next Section draw heavily on a 
passage of the NASEM report that I drafted in collaboration with Brendan Sa-
loner, Ph.D. I acknowledge his contributions with gratitude. See NASEM RE-
PORT, supra note 13, at 31–35. I also thank Rebecca Wolitz for identifying useful 
literature relating to this discussion. 
 46. Mikhail Valdman, A Theory of Wrongful Exploitation, 9 PHILOSOPHERS’ 
IMPRINT 1 (2009). 
 47. Richard T. DeGeorge, Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical Drugs: 
An Ethical Analysis, 15 BUS. ETHICS Q. 549 (2005); Maitland, supra note 31. 
 48. See, e.g., Mission & Purpose, PFIZER, http://www.pfizer.com/careers/en/ 
mission-purpose (“Consistent with our responsibility as one of the world’s prem-
ier innovative biopharmaceutical companies, we collaborate with health care 
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tical companies also are populated with, and even led by, physi-
cians and scientists, who entered their field in order to do good 
in the world.49 For these reasons, standard principles of business 
ethics (for example, honesty, disclosure, and adherence to prom-
ises) seem inadequate to conceptualize drug companies’ obliga-
tions.  
Yet alternative frameworks, such as classical liberal princi-
ples of medical ethics, are also ill fitting. Those principles—re-
spect for autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice50—
require absolute fidelity to patients’ interests. They are of lim-
ited utility in solving population-level problems, balancing com-
peting obligations, and making hard decisions about resource al-
location in the face of scarcity. In short, we lack an ethical 
lodestar to illuminate what ethical obligations to patients, if any, 
spring from pharmaceutical companies’ distinctive role in the 
market.  
Nor are more general ethical arguments about when actors 
have an obligation to affirmatively aid others very helpful in de-
fining the scope of companies’ obligations to make their products 
accessible. For instance, the rescue principle in moral philosophy 
posits that one has an obligation to come to the aid of another 
when one can do so at little personal cost.51 Such arguments 
have strong appeal in the context of hypothetical scenarios in-
volving a pair of individuals (for example, introductory philoso-
phy students may be asked, “Do I have a moral obligation to 
carry an infant off of a railroad track when the train is two hun-
dred yards off?”). However, they are hard to scale. They do not 
offer clear guidelines about the scope of a company’s obligations 
to a community, a nation, or a world of needy patients. 
 
providers, governments and local communities to support and expand access to 
reliable, affordable health care around the world.”). 
 49. See, e.g., Nancy A. Nichols, Medicine, Management, and Mergers: An 
Interview with Merck’s P. Roy Vagelos, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.–Dec. 1994, 
https://hbr.org/1994/11/medicine-management-and-mergers-an-interview-with 
-mercks-p-roy-vagelos (quoting the CEO of Merck: “We got involved in this pro-
ject because we recognized the seriousness of the health problem, and as a doc-
tor it is very hard for me to turn my back on that. We at Merck try to live by 
that ethic.”). 
 50. For a general overview of these bedrock principles of medical ethics, see 
TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETH-
ICS 101– 301 (7th ed. 2013). 
 51. See THOMAS SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 224–28 (1998). 
For a useful discussion of the duty to rescue in the context of access to pharma-
ceuticals, see Rebecca E. Wolitz, A Corporate Duty to Rescue: Biopharmaceuti-
cal Companies and Access to Medications (Dec. 15, 2017) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author). 
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Pharmaceutical company leaders may believe that one par-
ticular conception of the principle of fairness should drive con-
clusions about their ethical obligations relating to drug pricing. 
This conception turns on the notion of just rewards for effort ex-
pended and risk incurred. Because innovator companies take on 
substantial risk and invest considerable time, money, and effort 
in the development of new products, fairness arguably requires 
that they be able to reap the returns.52 Discussions about re-
stricting price are deeply offensive to this conceptualization of 
justice. 
The upshot is that although critics charge pharmaceutical 
companies with having committed moral wrongs, little construc-
tive discussion has taken place of what ethic should govern their 
behavior. In a sense, this is not surprising. It arises from the 
cognitive dissonance that Americans have—and perhaps should 
have—about wanting companies to innovate at the highest level 
and make the results available to everyone at a low price. It also 
reflects our love/hate relationship with pharmaceutical compa-
nies. Pharmaceutical companies make products we cherish. To-
bacco companies, in contrast, are easy to despise—their products 
are dangerous vices. A good start toward an honest moral dia-
logue about fair pricing would be to acknowledge the cognitive 
dissonance surrounding it. 
C. GLOBAL EQUITY CONCERNS 
Another perplexing moral problem is that tradeoffs may ex-
ist between improving the affordability of prescription drugs for 
Americans and maintaining their affordability to patients in 
other countries.53 Branded drug prices in the United States are 
generally higher than in other countries because most foreign 
governments have adopted stronger mechanisms than the 
United States for controlling prices—for example, more consoli-
dated price negotiations or direct price controls.54 Because we 
pay so much, pharmaceutical companies may be more willing or 
able to grant price concessions elsewhere, including outright do-
nation of critical medications to low-income countries. Actions 
we take to restrict price, therefore, could have unintended, but 
real, effects on drug affordability in less wealthy countries.  
 
 52. DeGeorge, supra note 47, at 549–50. 
 53. NASEM REPORT, supra note 13, at 34–35. 
 54. For a summary of several countries’ approaches, see id. at 82–86. 
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This prospect raises the question of what obligations, if any, 
Americans have to patients in the rest of the world. Some con-
ceptions of global justice hold that members of relatively wealthy 
societies have a moral obligation to consider the welfare of indi-
viduals in poorer countries in making policy decisions.55 Other 
views challenge the notion that such duties exist.56 Some even 
assert that the status quo is unfair: Americans not only pay more 
for marketed drugs, they shoulder a disproportionate share of 
the cost of developing those drugs.57 Pharmaceutical R&D is un-
derwritten both by the high prices Americans pay for medicines 
and the tax dollars we spend on basic-science research to identify 
promising new molecules.58 
Americans have not openly confronted these clashing view-
points as a polity, but strong measures to reduce the cost of pre-
scription drugs here would make the global-justice dilemma 
hard to ignore. Further, as with the other moral dilemmas dis-
cussed above, the problem has greater salience in the context of 
prescription drugs than in other areas of health policy. It is true 
that other health policy decisions we make, such as how much of 
federal agencies’ budgets to devote to health system capacity 
building in low-income countries, also affect the healthcare costs 
that poor countries must bear. However, because the market for 
prescription drugs is global but is propped up by high prices in 
the United States, tamping down drug prices has a zero-sum-
game quality that is unique. Squeezing one part of the drug-price 
balloon may cause it to bulge out in other areas. 
In addition to these moral factors, a number of problems in 
the market for prescription drugs contribute to making drug af-
fordability the hardest problem in health policy. I turn to these 
issues next. 
 
 55. See Charles R. Beitz, Cosmopolitanism and Global Justice, in CURRENT 
DEBATES IN GLOBAL JUSTICE 11–27 (Gillian Brock & Darrel Moellendorf eds., 
2005) (discussing how moral cosmopolitanism relates to ideas of global economic 
and political justice). 
 56. See Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 113 (2005) (discussing the limits of equality as a demand on global justice). 
 57. See, e.g., Rosenblatt & Termeer, supra note 32 (“It’s a chronic source of 
irritation for many in the U.S. that other countries get a relatively free ride, 
while the U.S. shoulders much of the cost of innovation.”). 
 58. See id. 
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II.  MARKET FACTORS   
The prescription drug market in the United States is 
plagued by numerous market failures and distortions that con-
tribute to high prices.59 Two deserve special focus: (1) the lack of 
transparency about drug prices, and (2) problems of perverse in-
centives. 
A. LACK OF TRANSPARENCY 
A profound absence of information makes it almost impossi-
ble to follow the money flowing through our drug delivery system 
from manufacturer to patient.60 Where are rents being ex-
tracted, and in what amounts? Which actors in the supply chain 
are the best targets for policy interventions to reduce patients’ 
ultimate costs? The answers to these questions are surprisingly 
hard to find. 
The supply chain that moves prescription drugs from those 
who make them to those who take them is long and complex. It 
includes manufacturers, wholesalers, PBMs, health insurers, 
prescribers, retail pharmacies, and patients.61 Within this sys-
tem is a complicated series of rebates and discounts from a drug’s 
list price.62 Each player in the supply chain makes its own deal 
as it passes the drug along to the next.63 The sizes of these re-
bates and discounts are kept cloaked by those who give and re-
ceive them.64 Because policymakers know so little about them, it 
is impossible to say with any certainty how much money each 
player is pocketing65 and where the major opportunities are to 
squeeze waste or reduce margins without loss to innovation. 
 
 59. For a summary of ways in which government intervention in the drug 
market distorts it, see NASEM REPORT, supra note 13, at 29. 
 60. Id. at 16. 
 61. Useful presentations of the flow of money and prescription drugs from 
manufacturers to patients are available in NASEM REPORT, supra note 13, at 
49–50. See also KAISER FAM. FOUND., supra note 10 (providing detailed analysis 
of the pharmaceutical supply chain); Jonathan D. Rockoff, Behind the Push to 
Keep Higher-Priced EpiPen in Consumers’ Hands, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 6, 
2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/behind-the-push-to-keep-higher-priced 
-epipen-in-consumers-hands-1502036741. 
 62. NASEM REPORT, supra note 13, at 16. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 16, 63. 
 65. Id. at 72 (“One cannot know with reasonable clarity how much money 
is retained at various levels, or how much of that which is retained is due to 
operational costs and how much is profit.”). For a description of one analyst’s 
attempt to draw conclusions about where money was being retained based on 
the available data, see id. at 69. 
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What policymakers get instead of information is a great deal 
of finger pointing among participants in the supply chain.66 
Manufacturers assert that they give big discounts off the list 
price to PBMs that PBMs do not fully pass on to health plans 
and patients.67 PBMs complain that the discounts they receive 
are not as generous as manufacturers portray, but provide little 
data to explain their claim.68 Further, PBMs claim their price 
negotiations with manufacturers score big savings for their 
health plan customers but health plans do not fully pass those 
savings along to consumers.69 Health plans object that even at 
the discounted prices they pay, drug prices are still crippling, 
and place the lion’s share of blame on manufacturers.70 In the 
 
 66. See Carolyn Y. Johnson, Pharma, Under Attack for Drug Prices, Started 
an Industry War, WASH. POST (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
business/economy/pharma-under-attack-for-drug-prices-started-an-industry 
-war/2017/12/29/800a3de8-e5bc-11e7-a65d-1ac0fd7f097e_story.html; see also 
NASEM REPORT, supra note 13, at 10–11, 62 (citing several additional newspa-
per articles discussing companies’ blaming of other companies for keeping drug 
prices high). 
 67. NASEM REPORT, supra note 13, at 16. For an example of an analysis 
funded by drug manufacturers blaming intermediary organizations for retain-
ing a hefty share of initial gross drug expenditures, see AARON VANDERVELDE 
& ELEANOR BLALOCK, BERKELEY RESEARCH GRP., THE PHARMACEUTICAL SUP-
PLY CHAIN: GROSS DRUG EXPENDITURES REALIZED BY STAKEHOLDERS 4–6 
(2017), https://www.thinkbrg.com/media/publication/863_Vandervelde_PhRMA 
-January-2017_WEB-FINAL.pdf (finding that manufacturers of branded drugs 
realized thirty-nine percent of drug expenditures while “non-manufacturer en-
tities” realized forty-two percent). 
 68. See, e.g., David Dayen, The Hidden Monopolies That Raise Drug Prices, 
AM. PROSPECT (Mar. 28, 2017), http://prospect.org/article/hidden-monopolies 
-raise-drug-prices (discussing the lack of transparency PBMs have in support-
ing their claims); Michael Hiltzik, How “Price-Cutting” Middlemen Are Making 
Crucial Drugs Vastly More Expensive, L.A. TIMES (June 9, 2017), http://www 
.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-pbm-drugs-20170611-story.html 
(same); Johnson, supra note 66 (discussing PBM claims that the majority of the 
savings they negotiate are passed on to consumers). 
 69. NASEM REPORT, supra note 13, at 62 (citing Jared S. Hopkins & Zach-
ary Tracer, Blame Game over High Drug Prices Escalates with New Ad, BLOOM-
BERG (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-04-06/ 
blame-game-over-high-drug-prices-gets-worse-with-lobby-s-new-ad). 
 70. See Lisa Schencker, Blue Cross Report Blames Pharma Companies for 
High Drug Prices, CHI. TRIB. (May 3, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/ 
business/ct-blue-cross-drug-prices-0504-biz-20170503-story.html. For examples 
of analyses funded by the pharmaceutical industry that shift blame to the in-
surance companies, see Peter J. Pitts, Rising Drug Prices the Fault of Insurers, 
Not Drug Companies, SACRAMENTO BEE (Aug. 29, 2016), http://www.sacbee 
.com/opinion/op-ed/soapbox/article98536387.html; Robert Zirkelbach, Why 
Won’t the Insurance Industry Tell the Truth About Medicine Costs?, PHRMA: 
THE CATALYST (May 10, 2017), https://catalyst.phrma.org/why-wont-the 
-insurance-industry-tell-the-truth-about-medicine-costs. 
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midst of this, it is difficult for policy makers to get a handle on 
where their focus ought to be.  
Another place where price transparency is strikingly absent 
is the point of prescribing, as the Auvi-Q story illustrates.71 
Many physicians today are sensitive to the problem of prescrip-
tion drug costs and would like to take the comparative costs of 
alternative treatments into consideration when making pre-
scribing decisions and describing options to their patients.72 
However, they lack information about how much particular 
drugs will cost health plans or patients—beyond, perhaps, which 
tier the largest health plans have situated the drug in on their 
formularies.73 For both prescribers and patients, it takes effort 
and tenacity to track down these costs. Even more challenging is 
finding information about how the cost of a drug compares to the 
long-term cost of treating the condition without the drug. Clini-
cal-decision support tools in electronic health record systems 
could help by embedding information in patients’ medical record 
about their prescription drug coverage and the costs of different 
drugs for their health plan; however, such functionalities have 
been slow to emerge.74 As a result, physicians have had difficulty 
 
 71. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 72. NASEM REPORT, supra note 13, at 110; see William H. Shrank et al., 
Physicians’ Perceptions of Relevant Prescription Drug Costs: Do Costs to the In-
dividual Patient or to the Population Matter Most?, 12 AM. J. MANAGED 
CARE 545 (2006) (concluding that physicians seek to manage out-of-pocket costs 
for patients). 
 73. See G. Michael Allan et al., Physician Awareness of Drug Cost: A Sys-
tematic Review, 4 PLOS MED. 1486 (2007) (analyzing studies showing physi-
cians’ lack of knowledge about the true costs of pharmaceuticals); Tim Schutte 
et al., Students and Doctors Are Unaware of the Cost of Drugs They Frequently 
Prescribe, 120 BASIC & CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & TOXICOLOGY 278 (2017) 
(analyzing survey results regarding physicians’ attitudes toward and 
knowledge of pharmaceutical costs). The challenge of becoming familiar with 
patients’ costs is compounded by the large number of different health insurers 
and plans in the United States, each of which has its own formulary and cost-
sharing requirements. NASEM REPORT, supra note 13, at 110. 
 74. Notably, in November 2017, a consortium of large vendors of electronic 
health records and PBMs announced a joint effort to deliver drug benefits and 
price information to prescribers at the point of care. As early as 2018, the func-
tionality may be available to the companies’ member providers, which include 
over half of all United States physicians and nearly two-thirds of patients. Tom 
Sullivan, Epic, Cerner, CVS Align with Surescripts to Make Personalized Pre-
scription Benefit, Pricing Info Available in EHRs, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (Nov. 
7, 2017), http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/epic-cerner-cvs-align 
-surescripts-make-personalized-prescription-benefit-pricing-info-available. 
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prescribing with price in mind, even when their patients would 
appreciate it.75 
Transparency is increasingly permeating other aspects of 
healthcare, such as hospital price and quality and physicians’ 
relationships with pharmaceutical companies.76 In contrast, 
opacity reigns in the biopharmaceutical sector. 
B. PERVERSE INCENTIVES 
A second market factor that is clearly contributing to the 
drug unaffordability problem is perverse incentives, which are 
rife throughout the system. I provide a brief tour of several illus-
trative examples, but there are many others.77 
The Auvi-Q story captures the problem presented by patient 
coupon programs. These seemingly well-intentioned programs 
enable patients to obtain branded drugs without the out-of-
pocket costs they would otherwise owe under their health plan’s 
cost-sharing requirements. The manufacturer absorbs the cost 
of the patient’s copayment or other cost-sharing obligation, at 
least for a limited period of time. 
Coupon programs can be a welcome relief for patients, but 
they burden health plans because their purpose and effect is to 
get patients onto expensive, branded drugs.78 They effectively 
counteract health plans’ efforts to encourage patients to choose 
less-expensive alternatives by placing them in formulary tiers 
 
 75. See NASEM REPORT, supra note 13, at 110. 
 76. Id. at 65. 
 77. One important issue not covered in this discussion is conflicts of inter-
est that arise from pharmaceutical companies’ financial relationships with phy-
sicians and patient-advocacy organizations, which can contribute to prescribing 
and advocacy of costly, branded drugs. See COMM. ON CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN 
MED. RESEARCH, EDUC., & PRACTICE, NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G AND MED., 
CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN MEDICAL RESEARCH, EDUCATION, & PRACTICE 12 
(Bernard Lo & Marilyn J. Field eds., 2009), http://www.nationalacademies 
.org/hmd/Reports/2009/Conflict-of-Interest-in-Medical-Research-Education 
-and-Practice.aspx; NASEM REPORT, supra note 13, at 93–94. 
 78. See Leemore Dafny et al., When Discounts Raise Costs: The Effect of 
Copay Coupons on Generic Utilization, 9 AM. ECON. J. ECON. POL’Y 91 (2017) 
(analyzing data on the effect of copay coupons); Joseph S. Ross & Aaron S. Kes-
selheim, Prescription-Drug Coupons—No Such Thing as a Free Lunch, 369 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1188, 1188 (2013) (finding that more than seventy-five percent of 
coupon programs were for drugs for chronic conditions, which patients will take 
for an extended period of time, and sixty-two percent were for drugs for which 
lower-cost treatments were available). 
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with lower cost sharing.79 Payments associated with coupon pro-
grams and similar discounts are illegal for Medicare patients un-
der federal antikickback laws,80 but have been permitted to op-
erate in the commercial market.81 They are an increasingly 
popular strategy among branded-drug manufacturers.82  
These programs have driven a wedge between the perceived 
interests of patients and those of their health plans. They are 
highly effective in inducing prescriptions for branded drugs: in 
one study, they increased branded-drug sales by sixty percent, 
with commensurate reductions in sales of generic drugs.83 Over 
time, higher health-insurer costs translate into higher premi-
ums, and coupons may expire, leaving the patient on the hook if 
he or she chooses to continue the drug.84 In these ways, coupon 
programs ultimately may redound to patients’ detriment as well. 
A similar incentives problem arises from direct-to-consumer 
advertising. Such advertising has become ubiquitous; pharma-
ceutical companies spent an estimated $6.4 billion on it in 2016, 
representing a sixty-two percent increase since 2012.85 Direct-
to-consumer advertisements are known to increase the rates at 
which patients ask their physicians for costly, branded drugs, 
 
 79. See NASEM REPORT, supra note 13, at 93; Leemore S. Dafny et al., Un-
dermining Value-Based Purchasing—Lessons from the Pharmaceutical Indus-
try, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2013, 2013–14 (2016). 
 80. David Grande, The Cost of Drug Coupons, 307 JAMA 2375, 2376 (2012). 
 81. Cf. Ross & Kesselheim, supra note 78, at 1189 (discussing litigation 
against manufacturers offering coupon programs in which plaintiffs argue, with 
no success to date, that coupons should be disallowed as illegal kickbacks in 
nonfederal insurance programs). 
 82. See Dafny et al., supra note 79, at 2014 (finding that the proportion of 
outpatient prescription drug revenue derived from drugs with coupon programs 
doubled between 2007 and 2010); Grande, supra note 80, at 2375 (noting that 
the number of coupons increased markedly between 2009 and 2011, rising to 
340 in 2011). 
 83. See Dafny et al., supra note 79, at 2014. Another analysis estimated 
that coupon programs will increase drug expenditures for commercially-insured 
patients by $32 billion over a decade. Grande, supra note 80, at 2376 (citing 
How Copay Coupons Could Raise Prescription Drug Costs by $32 Billion over 
the Next Decade, PCMA (Nov. 3, 2011), https://www.pcmanet.org/how-copay 
-coupons-could-raise-prescription-drug-costs-by-32-billion-over-the-next 
-decade). 
 84. Grande, supra note 80, at 2375. 
 85. Bruce Horovitz & Julie Appleby, Prescription Drug Costs Are Up; So 
Are TV Ads Promoting Them, USA TODAY (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www 
.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/03/16/prescription-drug-costs-up-tv-ads/ 
99203878. 
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and physicians frequently are willing to accede to such re-
quests.86 A 2016 review of studies concluded that patients’ re-
quests relating to advertised drugs “are typically accommodated, 
promote higher prescribing volume, and have competing effects 
on treatment quality.”87 
Because insured patients pay only a fraction of the cost of 
their drug, a negative externality arises when they request ad-
vertised drugs.88 Patients have insufficient incentives to avoid 
the resulting, costly insurance claims because others bear the 
bulk of those costs in the form of higher insurance premiums and 
Medicare taxes. This incentives problem contributes to the na-
tion’s high prescription drug bill.89 
Patients’ and health plans’ incentives also splinter because 
of problems with health-insurance benefit design. In the debate 
about affordability of prescription drugs, it is often forgotten that 
affordability is a function of two things: (1) drug prices; and (2) 
the generosity of a patient’s insurance coverage. Many Ameri-
cans are uninsured or underinsured for drug costs,90 and among 
the insured, incentives problems abound.  
Many prescription drug benefits are designed in a way that 
undercuts incentives for patients to behave as we would like. For 
example, cost-sharing requirements typically are not reduced or 
 
 86. In a 2015 poll, among eighty-two percent of respondents who had seen 
some form of direct-to-consumer advertising, more than a quarter spoke with 
their physicians about those ads. Of those, forty-three percent were prescribed 
the drug they asked about. Bianca DiJulio et al., Kaiser Health Tracking Poll: 
October 2015, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 28, 2015), https://www.kff.org/ 
health-costs/poll-finding/kaiser-health-tracking-poll-october-2015. A random-
ized, controlled trial involving patients with depression found that particular 
branded antidepressants were prescribed far more often when patients re-
quested them than when they did not. Richard L. Kravitz et al., Influence of 
Patients’ Requests for Direct-to-Consumer Advertised Antidepressants: A Ran-
domized Controlled Trial, 293 JAMA 1995, 1998–99 (2005). 
 87. Sara J. Becker & Miriam M. Midoun, Effects of Direct-to-Consumer Ad-
vertising on Patient Prescription Requests and Physician Prescribing: A System-
atic Review of Psychiatry-Relevant Studies, 77 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY e1293, 
e1293 (2016). 
 88. An externality occurs when “the well-being of a consumer or the pro-
duction possibilities of a firm are directly affected by the actions of another 
agent in the economy.” ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 
351–52 (1995). For a general discussion of externalities in the drug-marketing 
context, see Ramarao Desiraju & Thanh Van Tran, Spillovers and Other Exter-
nalities in Pharmaceutical Marketing, in INNOVATION AND MARKETING IN THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 673–700 (Min Ding et al. eds., 2014). 
 89. NASEM REPORT, supra note 13, at 91–92. 
 90. See id. at 98–99. 
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waived for drugs with large positive externalities, such as infec-
tious disease treatments,91 even though the association between 
higher out-of-pocket drug costs and lower medication adherence 
is well established.92 If a patient’s employer, health plan, and 
society have a strong interest in ensuring that the patient re-
ceives and takes a prescription drug in order to prevent harm to 
others, it is not economically rational to impose burdensome cost 
sharing. Rather, “arguments for eliminating financial barriers to 
treatment are compelling.”93 
Benefits design—like direct-to-consumer advertisements—
can also create a rift in patients’ and insurers’ incentive struc-
tures. Typically, patients’ coinsurance and deductible amounts 
are pegged to the list price of the drug, not the actual price the 
health plan paid for the drug.94 In other words, even if the health 
plan has received a big discount on the drug, the patient may 
nonetheless pay twenty percent of the much higher list price. 
That design creates situations in which the drug that is most 
cost-effective for the plan is not the one that costs the patient 
least. Consider, for instance, two competing drug therapies for 
hepatitis C with comparable cure rates: a sofosbuvir-ledipasvir 
combination therapy (sold by Gilead Sciences under the brand 
name Harvoni); and an elbasvir-grazoprevir combination (sold 
by Merck under the name Zepatier). Harvoni has a much higher 
list price ($94,916) than Zepatier ($54,841).95 A typical Medicare 
Part D patient96 with twenty percent coinsurance will pay $6995 
out of pocket for Harvoni. Cost-conscious patients should prefer 
Zepatier, which saves them more than $2000. The manufacturer 
of Harvoni, however, gives a much bigger rebate to health plans 
 
 91. Id. at 30, 78. 
 92. See Victoria Powell et al., Cost Sharing in Medicaid: Assumptions, Evi-
dence, and Future Directions, 73 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 383 (2015) (reviewing 
empirical evidence relating to low-income adults); see also KATHERINE SWARTZ, 
COST-SHARING: EFFECTS ON SPENDING AND OUTCOMES (2010), https://www 
.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2010/rwjf402103/subassets/ 
rwjf402103_1 (analyzing literature findings from the 1970s through 2010). 
 93. NASEM REPORT, supra note 13, at 78. 
 94. New Data Show More Than Half of Patients’ Out-of-Pocket Spending for 
Brand Medicines Is Based on List Price, PHRMA (Mar. 29, 2017), https:// 
www.phrma.org/press-release/new-data-show-more-than-half-of-patients-out 
-of-pocket-spending-for-brand-medicines-is-based-on-list-price. Stacie 
Dusetzina has stressed this point very effectively in public discussions about 
drug prices. See Dusetzina et al., supra note 12, at 1186; NASEM REPORT, supra 
note 13, at 76. 
 95. Dusetzina et al., supra note 12, at 1186. 
 96. Part D is Medicare’s prescription drug-benefit program. For a program 
summary, see infra notes 113–14 and accompanying text. 
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than the maker of Zepatier,97 so health plans’ incentive is to have 
patients on Harvoni. 
Very costly, one-time treatments like Zepatier and Harvoni 
also illuminate another incentives problem in the health insur-
ance system. Some drug therapies avoid the need for a lot of 
other expensive care, but the bulk of the savings is not seen for 
many years.98 Treating chronic viral-hepatitis patients with 
medication, for example, can avert cirrhosis, liver transplanta-
tion, and cancer.99 In such situations, it is cost-effective to pro-
vide access to drug therapy, but it is not necessarily economically 
rational from the current insurer’s perspective.100 Americans 
change insurance plans frequently, with most eventually moving 
to Medicare.101 Thus what is medically best for the patient and 
economically optimal for society is not always where the incen-
tives point for individual insurers.102 This problem is not unique 
to prescription drugs. On the contrary, that “the fragmented in-
surance system creates potential disincentives for coverage of 
 
 97. See Cathy Kelly, Medicaid May Offer Best Opportunity for Merck’s 
Zepatier, PINK SHEET (Mar. 28, 2016), https://pink.pharmaintelligence.informa 
.com/PS057545/Medicaid-May-Offer-Best-Opportunity-For-Mercks-Zepatier; A 
Tale of Two New Hepatitis C Drugs (Mar. 10, 2016), https://www.newswire.com/ 
news/a-tale-of-two-new-hepatitis-c-drugs-9058111 (noting that the rebate for 
Harvoni can be as high as forty-five percent off the list price and is more gener-
ous if the plan agrees to cover Harvoni exclusively). 
 98. Tomas J. Philipson & Andrew C. von Eschenbach, Medical Break-
throughs and Credit Markets, FORBES (Jul. 9, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/tomasphilipson/2014/07/09/medical-breakthroughs-and-credit-markets 
(“The key issue with [the hepatitis C drug] Sovaldi, which is representative of 
other treatments, is that costs are temporally front-loaded while benefits are 
delayed. In other words, we face costs now, but the benefits accrue over the 
course of a lifetime.”). 
 99. Zobair Younossi et al., Treating Medicaid Patients with Hepatitis C: 
Clinical and Economic Impact, 23 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 107, 107 (2017). 
 100. See Alexis P. Chidi et al., Economic and Public Health Impacts of Poli-
cies Restricting Access to Hepatitis C Treatment for Medicaid Patients, 19 VALUE 
IN HEALTH 326, 333 (2016) (finding that paying for hepatitis C drug therapy is 
cost saving but that “in a multipayer healthcare system, efforts to minimize 
costs for individual payers can result in cost shifting” and suggesting that, as a 
result, “collaborative efforts between state and federal payers may be needed to 
realize the full public health impact of recent advances in hepatitis C therapy”); 
David Cutler et al., Insurance Switching and Mismatch Between the Costs and 
Benefits of New Technologies, 23 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 750, 754 (2017) (sum-
marizing studies finding that there is a “disincentive for commercial insurer 
coverage” of hepatitis C drugs because “results [are] borne by Medicare and 
other downstream payers,” with one study estimating that savings would not 
accrue for a decade and a half ). 
 101. See Cutler et al., supra note 100, at 755–56. 
 102. See id. 
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therapies with up-front costs and long-lived or delayed benefits” 
is “a widely acknowledged feature of U.S. health care.”103 But the 
discovery of breakthrough drugs, such as the hepatitis C medi-
cations, has vaulted this particular perversity into special prom-
inence in that area of healthcare. 
Medicare reimbursement rules also create perverse incen-
tives. Most prescription drugs are covered by Medicare Part D, 
but drugs such as chemotherapy infusions that are administered 
in hospital-based or standalone outpatient clinics are covered 
under another component of the program, Part B. The Part B 
program reimburses providers for these drugs through an ar-
rangement known as buy and bill, in which providers buy the 
medications at the wholesale acquisition cost and then bill in-
surers and patients for their use. Currently, these providers are 
reimbursed at the average sales price of the drug plus six percent 
plus an administration fee.104 They derive substantial revenue 
by retaining the difference between the price they bill and their 
acquisition cost.105 
Consequently, the reimbursement structure provides an 
economic incentive to select drugs with the largest difference be-
tween the wholesale acquisition cost and the average sales 
price—which, in practice, means selecting more expensive drugs 
 
 103. Id. at 750. 
 104. NASEM REPORT, supra note 13, at 51; Blase N. Polite et al., Payment 
for Oncolytics in the United States: A History of Buy and Bill and Proposals for 
Reform, 10 J. ONCOLOGY PRAC. 357, 357–58 (2014). Recently, the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services implemented a partial fix to the Part B reim-
bursement problem discussed herein. On November 1, 2017, it finalized a rule 
stating that instead of being reimbursed at the average sales price plus six per-
cent, providers who participate in the federal 340B Drug Pricing Program will 
now be reimbursed at the average sales price minus 22.5%. Medicare Program: 
Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment and Ambulatory Surgical Center Pay-
ment Systems and Quality Reporting Programs, 82 Fed. Reg. 52,356, 52,362 
(Nov. 13, 2017) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 414, 416, 419). This change re-
flects the fact that under the 340B program, qualified hospitals, clinics, and 
health centers that serve a large proportion of low-income patients can buy pre-
scription drugs at deeply discounted prices. Walid F. Gellad & A. Everette 
James, Discounted Drugs for Needy Patients and Hospitals—Understanding the 
340B Debate, 378 NEW ENG. J. MED 501, 502 (2018). The average discount is 
estimated to be at least 22.5% off the average sales price. MEDICARE PAYMENT 
ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: OVERVIEW OF THE 340B DRUG 
PROGRAM, http://medpac.gov/docs/default-source/reports/may-2015-report-to 
-the-congress-overview-of-the-340b-drug-pricing-program.pdf. 
 105. See NASEM REPORT, supra note 13, at 112–13. 
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over cheaper ones.106 Studies suggest that oncologists adminis-
tering chemotherapy respond to this incentive in the predicted 
fashion.107 The unfortunate Medicare beneficiary pays twenty 
percent coinsurance on the drugs they select. This reimburse-
ment system has a complex history,108 but is hard to defend on 
economic grounds. 
Perverse reimbursement structures also characterize many 
PBM contracts. PBMs are paid in a variety of ways, but a com-
mon arrangement is to make money off the spread, or the differ-
ence between the price at which the PBM purchases the drug 
from the manufacturer, after obtaining a discount or rebate, and 
the price it charges health plans and other customers for procur-
ing the drug. A hypothetical manufacturer may list a drug at 
$1000, for example, but sell it to the PBM at the negotiated price 
of $700, and the PBM may then resell it to a health insurer for 
$850. Under this arrangement, the PBM’s incentive is to sell 
high—that is, to pass along as little of the $300 discount as it 
can. Further, a portion of PBMs’ annual fees is based on a given 
payer’s drug expenditures.109 Other unsavory reimbursement 
arrangements have also been reported.110 Increasing the preva-
lence of alternative fee arrangements, such as charging a flat fee 
for delivering a certain amount of product, would address the 
 
 106. Blase Polite et al., Reform of the Buy-and-Bill System for Outpatient 
Chemotherapy Care Is Inevitable: Perspectives from an Economist, a Realpolitik, 
and an Oncologist, in AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CLINICAL ONCOLOGY EDUCA-
TIONAL BOOK e75, e77 (Don S. Dizon et al. eds., 2015) (“[W]hen wholesale and 
retail prices for drugs diverge systematically, incentives for dysfunctional be-
havior may be created. Oncologists and hospitals profit on the spread between 
the reimbursed price and the wholesale cost.”). 
 107. See Polite et al., supra note 106 (discussing studies that suggest oncol-
ogists’ drug choices are responsive to this financial incentive); see also Mireille 
Jacobson et al., Does Reimbursement Influence Chemotherapy Treatment for 
Cancer Patients?, 25 HEALTH AFF. 437, 441–42 (2006); Mireille Jacobson et al., 
How Medicare’s Payment Cuts for Cancer Chemotherapy Drugs Changed Pat-
terns of Treatment, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1391, 1393–97 (2010). Some researchers 
have gone so far as to question whether clinically inappropriate chemotherapy 
drugs are being selected because of the higher remuneration associated with 
their use. See, e.g., Polite et al., supra note 106. 
 108. See Polite et al., supra note 104, at 357–58. 
 109. Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., The High Cost of Prescription Drugs in the 
United States: Origins and Prospects for Reform, 316 JAMA 858, 862 (2016). 
 110. Id. at 862 (“[W]hen one of the largest pharmacy benefit managers be-
came a publicly traded entity, it was obliged to disclose its business model, much 
of which depended on payments from drug makers for shifting market share to 
their products from others in its class.”). 
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perverse incentives in the current system and better align PBMs’ 
interests with those of their customers.111 
Incentive problems such as the ones outlined above contrib-
ute to the picture of a system that pits players—for example, pa-
tients and their health plans—against one another in a zero-sum 
game that invites strategic behavior. The lack of price transpar-
ency and the problem of perverse incentives are two illustrations 
of how “the complexity of the biopharmaceutical system makes 
it rife for exploitation.”112 
III.  POLITICAL FACTORS   
Finally, two political factors have made the problem of pre-
scription drug affordability especially vexing to solve. One re-
lates to political compromises that have hamstrung the federal 
government’s ability to act, and the other to the current political 
environment. 
A. THE LEGACY OF POLITICAL COMPROMISES 
Past political compromises have greatly contributed to the 
situation that we find ourselves in today. Chief among these are 
the congressional decisions to not allow the federal agency re-
sponsible for administering the Medicare and Medicaid Pro-
grams, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), 
to take cost or cost-effectiveness into consideration when it 
makes coverage decisions for the Medicare program and denying 
CMS the ability to negotiate directly for the price of drugs. 
Medicare has offered an outpatient prescription drug bene-
fit, known as Part D, since 2006.113 The benefit is administered 
through private plans—CMS contracts with insurance compa-
nies and authorizes them to sell Part D insurance policies that 
adhere to federal rules.114 
 
 111. See NASEM REPORT, supra note 13, at 55. 
 112. Id. at 11. 
 113. The Part D program was established by the Medicare Prescription 
Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 
Stat. 2066 (codified in relevant part at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j), 21 U.S.C. § 355 refer-
ences in text). 
 114. For a summary of the Part D benefit and how it is administered, see 
Susan Alder Channick, The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003: Will It Be Good Medicine for U.S. Health Policy?, 
14 ELDER L.J. 237, 246–56 (2006); see also Part D / Prescription Drug Benefits, 
CTR. MEDICARE ADVOC., http://www.medicareadvocacy.org/medicare-info/ 
medicare-part-d/#introduction (last visited June 17, 2018). 
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Today, Medicare accounts for about twenty-nine percent of 
all prescription drug spending in the United States115 Ordinar-
ily, massive payers have commensurately strong leverage in ne-
gotiating discounts on drugs for their health plans, but CMS 
does not. By statutory design, each private insurer that provides 
Part D coverage manages its own benefits, including drug pur-
chasing and drug formularies.116 They may hire PBMs to do this 
for them to increase their negotiating power. However, the gov-
ernment is prohibited from negotiating prices directly for Medi-
care patients, leaving negotiations fragmented among numerous 
buyers.117 
Federal law also imposes substantial restrictions on CMS’s 
ability to use information about the cost of treatments in making 
coverage decisions for Medicare. The Medicare Prescription 
Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, which cre-
ated the Part D benefit, provides that the program generally will 
cover outpatient prescription drugs for indications approved by 
the FDA, except for a few narrow categories of excluded drugs.118 
More generally, Medicare coverage is available for treatments 
that are “reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treat-
ment of illness or injury,”119 and historically, CMS has treated 
FDA approval for a particular indication as establishing that 
those criteria are met for a drug.120 It has not used cost as a com-
ponent of coverage determinations.121 
 
 115. JULIETTE CUBANSKI & TRICIA NEUMAN, SEARCHING FOR SAVINGS IN 
MEDICARE DRUG PRICE NEGOTIATIONS 1 (2017), http://files.kff.org/attachment/ 
issue-brief-searching-for-savings-in-medicare-drug-price-negotiations. 
 116. For details, see Haiden A. Huskamp & Nancy L. Keating, The New Med-
icare Drug Benefit: Formularies and Their Potential Effects on Access to Medi-
cations, 20 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 662 (2005). 
 117. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-111(i) (2012) (“In order to promote competition 
. . . the Secretary—(1) may not interfere with the negotiations between drug 
manufacturers and pharmacies and PDP sponsors; and (2) may not require a 
particular formulary or institute a price structure for the reimbursement of cov-
ered part D drugs.”). For a history and summary of this aspect of the legislation, 
see Thomas R. Oliver et al., A Political History of Medicare and Prescription 
Drug Coverage, 82 MILBANK Q. 283 (2004). 
 118. For example, drugs for hair growth, prescription vitamins, and drugs 
used to promote fertility are excluded. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS., MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFIT MANUAL: CHAPTER 6—PART 
D DRUGS AND FORMULARY REQUIREMENTS § 20.1 (Jan. 15, 2016), https://www 
.cms.gov/Medicare/Prescription-Drug-Coverage/PrescriptionDrugCovContra/ 
Downloads/Part-D-Benefits-Manual-Chapter-6.pdf. 
 119. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A). 
 120. NASEM REPORT, supra note 13, at 53. 
 121. Id.; Peter J. Neumann et al., Medicare’s National Coverage Decisions 
for Technologies, 1999–2007, 27 HEALTH AFF. 1620 (2008); Peter J. Neumann 
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CMS cannot decide to exclude other drugs or place them on 
a restrictive formulary tier; only individual Part D plans can 
make such decisions.122 This is important because even if CMS 
were given the authority to negotiate on behalf of all Part D 
plans, it would have little leverage without the power to exclude 
drugs for which companies refused to grant the sought-after 
price concessions.123 
Also noteworthy are federal statutory provisions relating to 
the use of comparative-effectiveness research in Medicare cover-
age decisions. Comparative-effectiveness research is “the gener-
ation and synthesis of evidence that compares the benefits and 
harms of alternative methods to prevent, diagnose, treat, and 
monitor a clinical condition or to improve the delivery of care.”124 
It examines “the overall value of a strategy . . . by considering 
costs and benefits together.”125 Its aim is not necessarily to pro-
mote lower-cost care, but it may identify ways to obtain more 
favorable clinical outcomes at lower cost.126 
The Affordable Care Act created an independent research 
institute to sponsor comparative-effectiveness research, but pro-
hibited findings of such research from being “construed as man-
dates for practice guidelines, coverage recommendations, pay-
ment, or policy recommendations.”127 The Secretary of Health 
and Human Services may not, for instance, adopt a threshold of 
a certain number of dollars per quality-adjusted life-year saved 
to decide whether or not Medicare will cover a particular drug.128 
 
et al., Medicare and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1516 
(2005). 
 122. See MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFIT MANUAL, supra note 118, 
at § 10.2. 
 123. NASEM REPORT, supra note 13, at 52 (“For buyers to be able to negoti-
ate on price they must have credible alternatives other than purchasing from 
the seller.” (quoting OECD, POLICY ROUNDTABLES: MONOPSONY AND BUYER 
POWER 10 (2009), https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/44445750.pdf )). 
 124. INST. OF MED., INITIAL NATIONAL PRIORITIES FOR COMPARATIVE EF-
FECTIVENESS RESEARCH 29 (2009). 
 125. Id. at 34. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
§ 6301(a), 124 Stat. 119, 734 (codified with some differences in language at 
42 U.S.C. § 1320e(d)(8)(a)(iv) (2012)); S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 111th CONG., THE 
PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: FACT VS. FICTION ON 
HEALTH CARE RESEARCH 1 (2009), https://www.finance.senate.gov/download/ 
2009/11/21/fact-vs-fiction-on-health-care-research-1. 
 128. Jane Hyatt Thorpe, Comparative Effectiveness Research and Health Re-
form: Implications for Public Health Policy and Practice, 125 PUB. HEALTH 
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This provision adopts the approach taken in an earlier statute, 
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which 
also provided federal funding for comparative-effectiveness re-
search.129 In order to overcome political objections to the fund-
ing, lawmakers made clear that the research could not be used 
to mandate policies concerning Medicare coverage or reimburse-
ment.130 
In understanding why these legislative provisions came to 
exist, it is hard to overlook the enormous lobbying presence of 
the biopharmaceutical industry.131 The top-ranking U.S. indus-
try on lobbying spending by far,132 the pharmaceutical industry 
spent $247 million in 2016.133 It spent more on lobbying the fed-
eral government in the first six months of 2017 than it has at 
any other time during those months over the last decade.134 Last 
year, the industry’s main trade association, the Pharmaceutical 
Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), asked its 
member companies to contribute another $100 million annually 
to strengthen its advocacy efforts and incurred lobbying expend-
itures of $57 billion—two-thirds more than its expenditures in 
2015.135 
 
REP. 909, 911 (2010) (citing Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Pub. L. 
No. 111-148, § 6301(c), 124 Stat. 119, 740 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320e-1).  
 129. Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, 177 (2009). 
 130. Thorpe, supra note 128, at 910.  
 131. See, e.g., Louise M. Slaughter, Medicare Part D—The Product of a Bro-
ken Process, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2314, 2314 (2006) (“The final legislation 
[creating Medicare Part D], heavily influenced by drug-company and health in-
surance lobbyists, focused mainly on the needs of those industries instead of 
those of the seniors it should serve.”). 
 132. See Ctr. for Responsive Pols., Top Industries, OPENSECRETS, https:// 
www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?indexType=i&showYear=2016 (last visited 
June 17, 2018) (showing that the pharmaceutical industry spent the most 
money on lobbying in 2016). 
 133. Ctr. for Responsive Pols., Pharmaceuticals/Health Products, OPENSE-
CRETS, https://opensecrets.org/lobby/indusclient.php?id=h04&year=2016 (last 
visited June 17, 2018). 
 134. The industry spent a total of $145 million in the first half of 2017. Jay 
Hancock, Everyone Says We Must Control Exorbitant Drug Prices. So, Why Don’t 
We?, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 25, 2017), https://khn.org/news/everyone 
-says-we-must-control-exorbitant-drug-prices-why-dont-we (discussing drug 
manufacturers’ contributions to congressional campaigns). 
 135. Jay Hancock, In Election Year, Drug Industry Spent Big to Temper Talk 
About High Drug Prices, NPR (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/ 
health-shots/2017/12/18/571206699/in-election-year-drug-industry-spent-big 
-to-temper-talk-about-high-drug-prices; Dylan Scott, Readying for Pricing 
Fight, Drug Lobby to Add $100 Million to Coffers, STAT NEWS (Oct. 25, 2016), 
https://www.statnews.com/2016/10/25/phrma-drug-lobby-fees. 
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The ban on CMS bulk purchasing or price negotiation of 
drugs arose from congressional attempts to overcome the indus-
try’s resistance to adding a prescription drug benefit to Medi-
care. Companies had long opposed such an addition because they 
foresaw that they would face a juggernaut at the bargaining ta-
ble.136 The legislative process surrounding the creation of the 
Part D program has been criticized for its hastiness, partisan-
ship, and rejection of provisions that clearly would have 
strengthened the long-term economic viability of the program—
CMS negotiating power among them.137 
The influence of Medicare beneficiaries has also played a 
role in the political deals reflected in current legislation govern-
ing Medicare. The large, politically active Medicare population 
strongly resists attempts to restrict access to benefits—espe-
cially those that can be framed as rationing.138 Lawmakers’ ef-
forts to toe the line between promoting comparative-effective-
ness research and reassuring elderly Americans that it would 
not lead to rationing and discrimination against the aged139 re-
flect their concerns about this pressure. 
It would take a great deal of fortitude to resist these political 
pressures and change the laws that hamstring CMS. Because of 
these past political compromises, when it comes to arresting pre-
scription drug cost escalation in the Medicare program, we start 
with a very unclean slate. 
 
 136. Lee Drutman, How Corporate Lobbyists Conquered American Democ-
racy, ATLANTIC (Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/ 
2015/04/how-corporate-lobbyists-conquered-american-democracy/390822; Stu-
art Silverstein, Lobbyists, Campaign Cash Help Drug Industry Stymie Bid to 
Restrain Medicare Prescription Costs, OPENSECRETS (Oct. 19, 2016), https:// 
www.opensecrets.org/news/2016/10/lobbyists-campaign-cash-help-drug 
-industry-stymie-bid-to-restrain-medicare-prescription-costs. See generally Oli-
ver et al., supra note 117 (describing political factors contributing to the omis-
sion of federal negotiating power from the legislation). 
 137. See, e.g., Slaughter, supra note 131, at 2314 (“At the behest of the Re-
publican leadership, however, the House Committee on Rules rejected all but 
one [proposed amendment], preventing them from being debated by Congress. 
Many of those amendments—among them, one requiring the administration to 
use beneficiaries’ collective purchasing power to negotiate lower prices and one 
allowing Americans to import cheaper drugs from Canada—would have made 
the legislation far more effective.”). 
 138. See Jonathan Oberlander & Marisa Morrison, Failure to Launch? The 
Independent Payment Advisory Board’s Uncertain Prospects, 369 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 105 (2013). 
 139. See S. COMM. ON FINANCE, supra note 127. 
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B. THE ATMOSPHERE OF SCANDAL 
A crisis atmosphere pervades discussions of pharmaceutical 
prices in Washington today. A dramatic upsurge in media pub-
licity about the drug-affordability problem has occurred over the 
past two years, in part due to the availability of new data but 
perhaps in even larger part driven by highly publicized drug-
pricing scandals.140 Serial instances of culpable conduct by a few 
companies, such as the Daraprim incident, have contributed to 
a policy frame in which “price gouging” by bad actors is the prob-
lem that needs to be solved.141 
Many patient advocates welcome the collision of factors that 
seems to have opened a “policy window”142 for taking action on a 
problem that has long troubled them. However, an atmosphere 
of crisis and scandal can make it harder to make real progress 
on a thorny policy dilemma. It can politicize and distort the prob-
lem in a way that makes it very hard to coolly deliberate about 
policy solutions. Under these conditions, public demands to “do 
something—quick!” may lead to suboptimal policymaking.  
Scandals can also lead policymakers and the public to paint 
an industry with a broad brush when in fact there is substantial 
variation in business practices among companies. Pharmaceuti-
cal companies rightly insist that there are big differences among 
them. There are big companies and small companies. There are 
differences in how diversified their portfolios are and how much 
risk they are shouldering. There are differences in the degree to 
which they are innovators versus mere acquirers and sellers of 
fully developed products. There are differences in their sense of 
mission and corporate social responsibility. For these reasons, it 
is not hard to understand why some companies may feel that a 
few bad apples have spoiled the barrel. Such feelings likely ex-
plain the recent decision by PhRMA to distance “innovative 
 
 140. See Drug Pricing, GOOGLE TRENDS, https://trends.google.com/trends/ 
explore?cat=16&date=today%205-y&q=drug%20pricing (last visited June 17, 
2018) (graphically depicting an upsurge in news stories yielded by a Google 
search of the term “drug pricing” beginning in 2016). 
 141. Press Release, H. Comm. on Oversight, Sanders and Cummings De-
nounce Continued Prescription Drug Price Gouging (Oct. 9, 2015), https:// 
democrats-oversight.house.gov/news/press-releases/sanders-and-cummings 
-denounce-continued-prescription-drug-price-gouging. 
 142. JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 
168–70 (2d ed. 1995). Kingdon posits that a window for policy change opens 
when three forces align: (1) recognition that a policy problem exists; (2) devel-
opment of policy proposals to address the problem; and (3) political events that 
bolster opportunities to take action. Id. 
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pharmaceutical companies” from “platform companies” that 
merely acquire and sell products,143 and, for the first time, re-
strict membership to companies that make significant expendi-
tures for R&D.144  
The atmosphere of investigation and scandal has not only 
muddled what the optimal policy responses to the drug-afforda-
bility problem are, it has also contributed to the finger pointing 
going on in Washington. Further, it has helped foster a mental-
ity in which the players in the biopharmaceutical sector keep in-
formation that would be helpful in the policy process submerged. 
There is a sense of hunkering down, rather than being transpar-
ent and helping to address problems by providing the infor-
mation that policy makers need. Finally, there is a palpable 
sense of victimization on all sides of the debate. Some pharma-
ceutical companies feel they have been unfairly targeted and 
misunderstood.145 Patients’ groups and members of the public 
point to the high-profile bad actors and the high profitability of 
the pharmaceutical industry as evidence that they have been 
hoodwinked.146 The way forward from here is hard to see. 
  CONCLUSION   
Leo Tolstoy wrote, “All happy families resemble one an-
other, each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.”147 Our 
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 145. See, e.g., Hancock, supra note 135 (noting that PhRMA has sought “to 
distance itself from drug companies earning bad headlines”); Tim McClung, Bi-
opharma Leads Sustained Economic Growth Driven by IP-intensive Industries, 
PHRMA (Sept. 26, 2017), http://catalyst.phrma.org/biopharma-leads-sustained 
-economic-growth-driven-by-ip-intensive-industries (stressing the critical con-
tributions that innovator companies have made in generating novel medicines 
and sustaining economic growth); Lydia Ramsey, We Asked Pharma Executives 
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(Jan. 23, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/what-if-drug-companies-no 
-longer-took-routine-price-increases-2017-1 (reporting that some companies 
have committed to limiting price increases for their products in reaction to pres-
sure caused by “bad apples” that were taking extreme measures to jack up 
prices). 
 146. Nancy Yu et al., R&D Costs for Pharmaceutical Companies Do Not Ex-
plain Elevated US Drug Prices, HEALTH AFFAIRS (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www 
.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170307.059036/full. 
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drug delivery system is among the unhappy families of American 
health policy, and its unhappiness is unique. Although some of 
its problems stem from features shared by other aspects of our 
healthcare system, it is also plagued by distinctive moral, mar-
ket, and political problems. 
Because of these factors, especially the lack of transparency, 
policy making in this area is like trying to find one’s way out of 
a dense thicket in dim light. Some progress has been made in 
responding to some of the worst excesses that have occurred. But 
as satisfying as it may be to see Turing Pharmaceuticals’ former 
CEO, Martin Shkreli, skewered for hiking the price of Daraprim, 
attention must be paid to the more fundamental problems con-
tributing to high drug prices. Those problems are systemic, mul-
tifaceted, and much more subtle. That makes them exactly the 
type of problem that Congress is least likely to be able to solve. 
Finding the right prescription is the hardest problem in health 
policy today. 
